Iran Resumes Nuclear Weapons Production At Mossad Facilities Accused Of Exploding

Iran has resumed production of advanced centrifuge equipment at the Karaj nuclear site that it accused Mossad of blowing up in June, the Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday.

The report cited Western diplomatic sources who expressed concern that Iran could secretly start diverting advanced centrifuges to undeclared sites if it wanted to sneak up on a nuclear weapon.

Centrifuges enrich uranium to potentially make a nuclear weapon, and some of Iran’s more advanced models can speed that process four to five times compared to older models.

These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the IAEA admitted in September that it did not know what was happening in Karaj since June and by the refusal of the Islamic Republic to allow nuclear inspectors access to the site or explain what happened to the authorities. surveillance cameras. .

Although Tehran has claimed that the deferral of access to the IAEA is related to its investigation of the June sabotage attack in which the site was attacked by a drone, allegedly run by Mossad, IAEA Director General Rafel Grossi, He had already said in September that this explanation was no longer valid. Water.

The Iranian flag flies in front of the UN office building, which houses the IAEA headquarters, amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, in Vienna, Austria, on May 24, 2021 (credit: LISI NIESNER / REUTERS).

Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has expressed concern that with a growing new supply of 60% enriched uranium and advanced centrifuges, it would be easier to hide aspects of the nuclear program than in the past, when a larger space was needed for a number. much older. Less advanced centrifuges were needed to enrich lower quality uranium.

Former Mossad Director Yossi Cohen has also expressed concern about Iran’s ability to conduct clandestine movements and that any return by the United States to a nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic would require much stricter controls on the nuclear program.

The quoted Western diplomats said there were no signs that Iran was trying to launch a nuclear weapon faster, but it was unclear how they would know if Tehran was trying to do so clandestinely.

Israeli intelligence officials have also raised concerns that the more advanced the centrifuges, open or covert, the greater the danger that Iran could eventually break down not just with a nuclear weapon, but in line with its 1999-2003 plans. of five weapons.

It was unclear how Western diplomats had information about the general events in Karaj without being able to physically visit the site and whether the disclosures were based on a summary of the events broadcast by Iran or on independent sources.

The report also noted that some of the 170 newly built advanced centrifuges from the parts produced in Karaj were being installed at Tehran’s fortified and underground Fordow facilities. Furthermore, the report said that part of the production in Karaj had already resumed in August, but that now production had risen to much higher levels.
Iran’s centrifuge production is a critical issue in talks with world powers beginning on November 29 to reactivate the 2015 nuclear deal, and it was possible that the latest leaked reports could also be an attempt by the ayatollahs to try to intimidate. the Biden administration to accept new concessions for fear of how far Iran will go if a deal is not reached soon.

Israel continues to oppose any negotiations inspired by the 2015 agreement that it considers too weak to limit Iran’s nuclear enrichment, ballistic missile program and regional aggression, as well as being problematic due to its expiration dates in 2025 and 2030.

With the Islamic Republic already at more than 1,000 advanced centrifuges and the 2015 agreement requiring it to have far fewer than 100 such centrifuges, Israeli intelligence officials are concerned that any deal that does not lead to the destruction of those new centrifuges will be almost insignificant.

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